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Options to Protect Coastlines and Secure
Maritime Jurisdictional Claims in the Face of Global
Sea Level Rise
CT

Clive Schofield and David Freestone
A

1. Introduction

It is now widely accepted that significant sea level rise is taking place and that this
phenomenon is likely to accelerate in the future. This poses potentially disastrous
implications for many coastal States, especially those with large and heavily
populated low-lying coastal areas, as well as small low-lying island States. In
addition to the essentially terrestrial, inward-looking threat posed to low-lying coastal
areas and their associated populations from inundation by rising seas, threats also
exist looking outward from the land to the ocean spaces adjacent to such threatened
territories. In particular, sea level rise has the potential to significantly affect national
claims to maritime jurisdiction all the way to the outward extent of maritime zones.
Generally, the coastal baseline from which States’ maritime zones are
measured is the “normal” low-water line. From this baseline States may measure
their territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.
Consequently, if the low-water mark recedes as a result of inundation and sea level
rise, this may affect the measurement of all of a country’s maritime zones. Because
coastal States’ baselines are predominantly based on the “normal” low-water line, if
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those “normal” baselines recede as a consequence of sea level rise, so too will the
maritime zones measured from such baselines, leading to the erosion of the coastal
State’s maritime claims. Further, sea level rise has the potential to inundate small
islands and other geographical features that may also be used as critical basepoints in
the definition of the limits of claims to maritime jurisdiction. This too may have
major impacts on the capacity of an insular feature to generate maritime jurisdictional
claims.
This chapter begins by outlining some of the issues and uncertainties
associated with the phenomenon of global sea level rise with an emphasis on its
uneven impacts both temporally and spatially. Next, the chapter explores potential
impacts stemming from sea level rise. It then assesses several responses open to
coastal States in the face of rising sea levels. These responses include both the
construction of physical defenses, notably in the form of sea defenses, and emerging
“soft” engineering strategies and more adaptive planning measures. The final options
discussed to preserve maritime jurisdictional claims are legal; among these are
options to preserve maritime jurisdictional claims despite the inundation of coasts,
including the fixing of normal baselines and/or the maritime jurisdictional limits
derived from them. The chapter critically appraises some of these options and
proposals open to coastal States seeking to address and adapt to the challenges posed
to their maritime jurisdictional rights by sea level rise, drawing on the relevant
scholarly literature that has developed on this topic over the past two decades.
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A

2. Sea Level Rise: Complexities and Uncertainties

Significant evidence exists to support the contention that climate change is already
having multiple, sustained, extremely serious, and real impacts on the oceans. Indeed,
there now exists broad agreement in the scientific community as to the reality of
rising sea levels on a global scale. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the current state of
scientific knowledge about the pace and causes of sea level rise and the
accompanying uncertainties. As it shows, sea level rise is a phenomenon that exhibits
marked spatial and temporal variability. Sea level varies diurnally, under the
influence of the tides, but also seasonally, regionally and interannually.1 Moreover,
the impacts on a particular coastline are substantially dependent on its particular
characteristics, such as the morphology of the seabed immediately offshore.
Uncertainties also arise in determining the extent of actual sea level rise
against the backdrop of ongoing long-term cyclical changes. However, even
relatively modest sea level rise has the potential to have severe consequences and
pose major challenges for coastal States.

A

3. Threats Posed by Sea Level Rise

B

3.1. Threats to Land

The most immediate concern for coastal States is the threat that sea level rise could
lead to the inundation of substantial, valuable, and populated parts of their land
territory. Such a scenario could in all probability result in the large-scale
displacements of coastal-dwelling populations and the loss of associated properties
and infrastructure. Even without total or periodic inundation, sea level rise would be
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likely to make such low-lying areas more vulnerable to extreme weather events such
as storm surges, thus rendering them less and less habitable. A further consequence
could be increasing saltwater intrusion and the loss of valuable habitats such as
coastal wetlands, some of which are protected by international treaties.2 Alarm bells
over these threats were rung by a number of scholars at least two decades ago.3
These threats pose an especially problematic prospect in light of the fact that
there is a general migration trend from rural to urban areas and from interior/highland
to coastal areas. Indeed, coastal areas represent the most populated parts of the global
landmass. One study estimates that sea level rise of one meter would inundate
territory presently occupied by around 60 million people.4 Significant sea level rise
would therefore necessarily pose daunting socioeconomic, environmental, and human
security challenges on a global scale.

B

3.2. Threats to Maritime Jurisdiction

In addition to threats to land territory, sea level rise could potentially result in
significant reductions in the spatial extent of national claims to maritime jurisdiction.
Changes to coastlines and therefore to baselines leading to the potential submergence
of key basepoints from which claims to maritime jurisdiction are measured could
have huge and incremental impacts on national claims to maritime jurisdiction.
Reductions in the size of zones to which certain coastal States may be entitled are
likely to have profound economic as well as jurisdictional consequences, because
rights over these maritime spaces dictate exploitation rights over valuable resources
that might also therefore be lost. Low-lying island States, such as Kiribati, the
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Maldives, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, which have geographically restricted
territory,5 appear to be especially vulnerable to these threats. This type of threat is
likely to be exacerbated where island groups are particularly dispersed and critical
basepoints, on which broad maritime jurisdictional claims depend, come under threat.
However, just as sea level rise is understood to be a spatially and temporally
uneven phenomenon, so too are the impacts of sea level rise in light of the variability
and complexity of coastlines. A vertical sea level change applied to a relatively steep
coastline will have an insignificant impact in terms of the horizontal position of the
normal baseline. Where the gradient of the coastline is shallow, however, even a
relatively slight vertical change can result in substantial shifts in the position of the
baseline horizontally. However, it is by no means the entire normal baseline that
contributes to the outer limits of a maritime claim. Thus if the critical controlling
basepoints are not affected, then the relevant maritime limits will also not move.

B

3.3. Implications for Islands

Sea level rise has significant potential consequences for islands and their inhabitants.
Most obviously, it could lead to the inundation of parts or even the entirety of the
land territory of certain islands, forcing the displacement of significant numbers, or
even all, of their inhabitants. Although the total inundation of inhabited islands as a
direct result of sea level rise has apparently yet to occur, in certain cases, such as that
of the Cateret Islands of Papua New Guinea, the relocation of threatened populations
is already planned and ongoing (see later discussion).
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Even if the total inundation of island territory does not take place (at least in
the short term), climate-change-related impacts could make it increasingly untenable
for island communities to be sustained on certain islands, forcing their populations to
leave.6 Indeed, even a relatively slight rise in sea level, of a few tens of centimeters,
could render certain islands uninhabitable by, for instance, increasing the incidence
of severe flooding or curtailing the availability of potable water.7 For example,
although Fongafale Island, the largest island in Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu, reaches an
elevation of 1.2 m, a sea level rise of 0.6 m would submerge the island’s central
depression, which lies between its elevated storm and lagoonal ridges. Many of its
population of around 5,000 live there.8 Similarly, only one island, Kanton Island, in
Kiribati’s Phoenix Islands group, is presently inhabited; several other islands in the
group supported populations in the past, but no longer can because of a lack of
potable water.9
Sea level rise also has the potential to threaten the insular status of certain
features. For example, an island that is presently always above water level may, as a
consequence of sea level rise, disappear during high tide, thus being reduced to the
status of a low-tide elevation. (features that are exposed at low tide but are
submerged at high tide). Under Article 13 of the LOSC, low-tide elevations may only
act as basepoints if they fall wholly or partially within the breadth of the territorial
sea measured from the baseline of a State’s mainland or island coasts.10
Consequently, such features have been termed “parasitic basepoints.”11 As a result, if
sea level rise causes certain features to be reduced to the status of a low-tide
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elevation or to be submerged entirely, the coastal State concerned could lose
significant maritime rights.12
As a result, it could be Alternatively, sea level rise could lead to the
reclassification of a feature from being an, as it were, ‘full’ island, from which claims
to the full range of maritime zones may be made, to one of the categories of insular
formation from which only restricted maritime claims can be made. In particular,
Article 121(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) of
1982 states that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life
of their own” are incapable of generating exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or
continental shelf rights.13 The significance of such a change of insular status is
illustrated by the United Kingdom’s reclassification of Rockall from full “island” to
“rock” status, resulting in the loss to the United Kingdom of around 60,000 square
nautical miles of maritime space previously claimed as part of the United Kingdom’s
fishery zone.14

Whether the threats to the ability of islands to support habitation and thus,
ultimately, to the viability of small Island States are solely (or even largely) the
consequence of climate change and sea level rise is open to debate. Coral cays, for
example, may naturally be subject to evolution and decay over time.15 Conversely, it
may be that some of these features are capable of natural adaption to sea level rise
over time; evidence suggests that coral islands are remarkably robust and enduring
features, with the geological record indicating that atolls have survived sea levels a
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half-meter higher than present levels.16 Kench indicates that recent evidence from the
Maldives suggests that the sea level rose by a half-meter around 2,000–4,000 years
ago, after the islands in question were formed, yet the islands developed and
remained above sea level.17 Similarly, Webb and Kench, in an analysis of twentyseven coral atoll islands in the central Pacific Ocean, found that 86% of these
features had either remained stable or increased in area over a 20- to 60-year
timescale despite a reported sea level rise in the central Pacific region.18 This
phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter 2, but at the least runs counter to
widespread perceptions that sea level rise will inevitably lead to the erosion of island
shorelines.
A critical issue in this context is the health of coral island ecosystems, as is
also highlighted in Chapters 2 and 15. Rising populations, land use changes,
pollution, and building work along the coast, including the construction of
breakwaters, seawalls, and other sea defenses, can adversely affect the health of coral
reefs. In particular such interventions can reduce calcification rates, leading to greater
erosion as opposed to coral build-up. Further, the interruption of natural sediment
flow regimes can compromise the ability of coral islands to adapt to changing sea
levels, undermining the island’s natural ability to adapt to sea rise.19

B

3.4. Total Inundation of States

The complete or significant inundation of low-lying States, particularly island States,
poses a number of novel legal problems. If the sea level continues to rise steadily, as
many scientists predict, this could cause an existential crisis for a number of States.
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Although it does not seem imminent, a number of States have been identified that
could be rendered uninhabitable by a one-meter rise in sea level and a subsequent
increase in storms, flooding, and the loss of the freshwater lens; that is, the layer of
freshwater accumulated from rainfall floating on top of denser saltwater. The
question is whether such a State, such as the Maldives, could continue to exist if its
land area is completely submerged by the sea or so much of it is under water that it
cannot sustain sufficient population to have “an economic life of its own,” as
required by Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC. That said, the lack of specificity in the
language of Article 121(3), coupled with the flexible interpretation of these
provisions in State practice should be borne in mind.
Such a scenario would raise fundamental questions of continued sovereignty
and the ability of such States to continue to function in the international sphere.
These issues are discussed by Jenny Grote-Stoutenburg in Chapter 3, and Chapters
8–11 examine the legal status of persons displaced by climate change and the various
options for accommodating them in new locations.
It should, however, be borne in mind that the rise in sea level will be a
gradual and an episodic process. As long ago as 1989 a Commonwealth Secretariat
Expert Group suggested a “variety of ways in which ... it would be possible for many
inhabited low lying islands to adapt, albeit with external assistance.”20 Webb and
Kench’s recent study, mentioned earlier, also suggests that sea level rise may lead to
unanticipated outcomes, especially in coral island contexts.21 Although we should not
ignore the problems of complete inundation discussed earlier, planning in the short
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and medium term is important to facilitate effective cooperation needed to combat
the less dire short-term effects of sea level rise. Customary international law, as
Soons suggests, does provide mechanisms to meet many of the novel situations
presented by the effects of sea level rise.22

A

4. Response Options

B

4.1. Planned Retreat and Relocation

The easiest option, in one sense at least, is to do nothing. Rather than attempting to
protect the coast and stabilize its present location, one possibility would be to simply
manage the impacts of rising sea levels. Such an approach would allow coastlines to
find their own “natural equilibrium,” thus avoiding the need to construct costly sea
defenses.23 The disadvantages of such an essentially passive response, however, are
all too obvious. Such an approach would necessarily lead to the inundation of coastal
territory, the displacement of populations, the loss of built-up areas and associated
infrastructure, and the sacrifice of important coastal habitats such as wetlands.24 It is
therefore doubtful that such a “do-nothing” policy would prove to be politically
acceptable.25 Nonetheless, such approaches, that recognize increased dynamism in
the coastal zone, could provide for coastal development that is responsive rather than
resistant to change. In this context a “planned retreat” would include
removing/relocating coastal developments after defined “setbacks” are encroached on
through coastal erosion.26
For small Island States, the option of simply allowing the landward
encroachment of low water lines is even less attractive than for mainland continental
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States, because several small Island States have severely restricted territorial extents.
There is little scope for the coastline to retreat before islands may have to be
abandoned in their entirety. Indeed, in some States this process is already occurring.
In 2005 a decision was made to relocate the 2,600 inhabitants of the Cateret Islands
of Papua New Guinea in response to rising sea levels.27 Similarly, in 2006, the Indian
island of Lohachara, located in the Sundarbans region where the Ganges and
Brahmaputra rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal and once the home to 10,000
people, was reportedly evacuated because of the impacts of sea level rise, albeit “as a
precaution.”28

B

4.2. Protecting the Coast

A traditional means of protecting, or at least attempting to protect, a threatened
coastline from erosion is implementation of the “bulkhead” policy. 29 Hard
engineering options, such as the construction of sea walls, groins, and wave reduction
structures – notably revetments, offshore breakwaters, rock armor, and gabions – are
intended to stabilize the position of the coast and protect key infrastructure located in
the coastal zones.30 It is generally accepted that coastal States can, by implementing
such measures, stabilize portions of their baselines and thereby preserve their
associated maritime zone entitlements. 31 While tried and tested, this approach has
also repeatedly demonstrated that such construction can result in significant and
problematic consequential impacts, including interrupting natural sediments flows
and causing unexpected erosion and/or deposition to other parts of the coast.32
Indeed, the impacts of such hard defenses are not confined to the coastal zone they
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were designed to protect. Instead, the interruption of natural erosional processes in
one area of a coast can affect adjoining coastal areas, depriving them of their
sediment supply. In areas where there is already coastal erosion, the bulkhead policy
may lead to an acceleration of the natural erosion rate. In one well-documented case
on the east coast of England the erosion rate along 15 km of unprotected coast
adjoining a section of seawall increased fourfold over a 50-year period. 33 Even in
areas of coastal deposition, such as estuaries, coastal wetlands, and sand dunes, the
deprivation of sediment caused by a bulkhead policy may reduce or prevent accretion
that may, in turn, result in increased flood damage to low-lying coastal hinterlands as
sea level rise continues. 34
These types of impacts are especially problematic in the context of coral
islands, which depend on uninterrupted sediment flows to sustain the island-building
processes that maintain their integrity: “[t]he physical dynamics of sediment supply
and transport are critical factors in the context of management of rocky and
sedimentary oceanic islands.”35 Consequently, often such approaches have been
criticized as large scale, costly, disruptive, and resulting in “unfortunate and
sometimes very serious unintended consequences.”36 Instead, an ecosystem-based
and sustainable management approach is especially relevant in the management of
coral cays and other islands associated with coral reefs.37
Unilateral action by one State may have considerable effects on its neighbors.
It can be argued that, by analogy with situations that have arisen along shared or
transboundary rivers, action by one national authority in building a bulkhead that
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deprives another area in another State of sediment could give rise to liability under
international law.38 For instance, sediment transport studies within the North Sea
suggest that fine-grained sediment, derived from the cliff erosion on the east coast of
England, comprises an important source of suspended material in the North Sea that
is vital for the accretion of coastal mudflats and marshes bordering Wadden Sea
States.39 In this instance, a bulkhead policy by one State that seeks to preserve the
current coastal morphology may seriously exacerbate the problems faced by its
neighbors. In West Africa, Shannon demonstrated that a combination of seawall
construction, harbor building, and damming of inland rivers, by depriving the coast
of sediment, has led to accelerated erosion in neighboring States.40
Boyle points out that the Trail Smelter Arbitration41 and the Corfu Channel
cases42 “have long supported the proposition that no State may cause or permit its
territory to be used to inflict serious harm on other States.”43 It seems clear, therefore,
given the current state of awareness of the global nature of the world ecosystem, that
a State does not have the right to behave, even in its own territory, in a way that
damages its neighbors. Most international environmental lawyers now agree that the
behavior of one State that adversely affects shared areas or even damages its own
territory in a manner that affects the global ecosystem will give rise to responsibility
by that State to others. Of course, a chain of causation must be proved to establish
responsibility, and indirect damage may be virtually impossible to prove.
Faced with increasing criticism of hard engineering structures on the coast,
engineers and coastal managers have examined alternatives that use the natural
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coastline to absorb wave energy and prevent erosion. For example, in 1992 a UK
government report stated,
EXT

Increasing realization of the effectiveness [of natural coastal systems]

has led engineers to question the value of traditional coastal defences or
protective structures. Instead they are examining solutions to coastal problems
which seek to control or emulate natural systems rather than to replace them.
This has become known as soft engineering – the solution of coastal
management problems through environmentally sensitive schemes which
involve substantial or total utilization of natural systems as an integral part of
the solution. These are more consistent with ecological principles and other
conservation interests as well as having greater social acceptability.44
Nevertheless, despite the known and notable drawbacks of the bulkhead
policy, this hard engineering approach may remain appropriate to protect especially
valuable parts of the coast. Such high-value locations may include key coastal
locations such as cities (salient, though not necessarily ideal examples include the
system of levees at New Orleans and the seawall surrounding Male in the
Maldives).45
It is also conceivable that States may seek to preserve critical basepoints in
this way; Japan’s efforts to preserve its southernmost territory, Okinotorishima
perhaps represents the most extreme example in this context. Okinotorishima (also
known as Douglas Reef) comprises two groups of very small rocks resting on top of
a relatively broad coral reef platform. These features are only marginally above the
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high-water mark and are vulnerable to erosion.46 Japan takes the view that these
features are islands capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights. To
protect the above-water rocks making up Okinotorishima, in the late 1980s Japan
constructed sea defenses, vertically higher than the islets themselves, which form a
360-degree ring around each of the threatened features. It should be noted that
Japan’s extensive maritime claims from Okinotorishima have been protested by other
States. In particular, both China and the Republic of Korea have expressed the view
that these features are no more than “rocks” within the meaning of LOSC Article
121(3).47
This type of approach, however, is clearly not suited to all coastlines. For
example, it has been suggested that the cost of Japan’s sea defenses around
Okinotorishima exceeded US$200 million.48 Moreover, Lewis has pointed out the
problems of building traditional sea defenses for Fanafuti, the main island of Tuvalu
on which 2,700 of the country’s total population of 8,500 live:
EXT

The land form of Fanafuti is so narrow and attenuated that in order to

protect its 2.5 square kilometers, 54 kilometers of sea defences would have to
be constructed. Moreover, so narrow is the land form for much of its length
that sea defences on one side would be protecting the back of sea defences on
the other with nothing in between.49
In addition, the land behind the defense would have to be raised to prevent flooding
from within resulting from the porous character of the coral rock which these features
predominantly comprise. The situation is similar in many other coral islands.50
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An analogous approach, and one long practiced by low-lying coastal States
such as the Netherlands, has been to undertake reclamation projects as a means to
build up or extend coasts. A related response by threatened island States could be the
construction of artificial or even floating islands. Indeed, the Maldives is actively
pursuing precisely this type of strategy. Its objective is reportedly to construct
multiple large artificial islands, elevated to approximately 3 m above sea level and
reinforced with concrete, to provide safe refuges for the country’s population.51
Although it is acknowledged that, in accordance with the terms of Article 60(8) of
the LOSC, artificial islands, together with artificial installations and structures “do
not possess the status of islands,” “have no territorial sea of their own,” and are
excluded from affecting maritime boundary delimitation, there appears to be nothing
to prevent the extension and, arguably, preservation of a naturally formed feature
through reclamation works.

B

4.3. Using Basepoints

At the core of the legal questions relating to potential impacts of sea level rise on
national claims to maritime jurisdiction is Article 5 of the LOSC. This article, which
is generally taken to represent customary international law, provides that “the normal
base line for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line along
the coast as marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”52
Such normal baselines represent the predominant type of baselines worldwide. As
discussed earlier and in Chapter 5, it has long been recognized that parts of the coast
can be dynamic and can change location and configuration in relatively short periods
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of time. Consequently, as normal baselines change or “ambulate,” so too will the
maritime jurisdictional limits measured from them.53 Although the 1982 Convention
does not touch on this issue, it is possible to reach such a view through a “negative
implication” of the LOSC (laid out in depth by Rayfuse in Chapter 7). This
represents a critical concern in the context of sea level rise.
As Rayfuse further describes, Article 7 of the LOSC permits a coastal State to
use straight baselines “in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in the immediate vicinity.”54
States that use this system, derived from the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,55 must comply with other technical
conditions56: for example, straight baselines may only be drawn from “appropriate
points” – islands and other features that are above water at high tide – and low-tide
elevations may only be used as basepoints if “lighthouses or similar installations
which are permanently above sea level have been built on them.”
However, such straight-line baselines are also potentially threatened by sea
level rise, because the basepoints, which “anchor” or tie the defined baselines, may
also be inundated and may therefore lose their legal effect.57 In such a case, if a lowwater line may be maintained by extensive and, of course, expensive artificial
construction, then using similar artificial means to bolster basepoints may also be a
legitimate way by which a country can maintain straight baseline points. The
artificial maintenance of islets, rocks, and other similar features may prevent them
from becoming low-tide elevations. In addition, new artificial installations may be
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built on low-tide elevations to bring them within the terms of Article 7(4). Indeed,
coastal States are likely to use the proviso of Article 7 – that the drawing of baselines
to and from low-tide elevations is permissible if it “has received general international
recognition” – to argue that if features listed on charts subsequently submerge, they
can maintain legal status because they have already received the required
recognition.58
In circumstances specified by Article 7 of the LOSC, coastal States are
allowed to use straight baselines joining headlands, islands, rocks, and other features.
The disappearance of key geographical features that are used as basepoints, and on
which the limits of such claims depend, as a result of sea level rise could have
significant impacts on the States. As noted earlier, this threat to the extent of national
maritime jurisdictional claims is especially significant for coastal States, such as
Bangladesh, that have large stretches of low-lying coasts. Indeed, where a broad
coastline regresses rapidly, as in the case of areas of Bangladesh where erosion rates
are up to 140 meters a year,59 the cumulative effect can be quite substantial. In fact, it
was in recognition of Bangladesh’s situation that Article 7(2) of the LOSC was
drafted. It permits, in restricted circumstances, straight baselines to be maintained
notwithstanding the movement of the actual coast:
EXT

Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions

the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points (i.e. for straight
baselines) may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water
line and, notwithstanding the subsequent regression [sic] of the low-water
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line, the straight baseline shall remain effective until changed by the coastal
State in accordance with this Convention.
Although this provision was drafted for specific circumstances, it has long been
recognized that it could be used in response to sea level rise. Most notably, more than
twenty years ago some already argued that there was a risk that in the context of sea
level rise this limited exception would be used more widely than was contemplated
by, or many might regard as legitimate under, the LOSC regime.60 The reality of
changing baselines in the twenty-first century may, however, prompt attempts to use
a much broader application of these provisions.

B

4.4. Islands

Analogous issues arise in respect of the use of islands as basepoints for the
generation of maritime claims. Under Article 121(1), an “island” is “a naturally
formed area of land surrounded by water” and is entitled to claim the full suite of
maritime zones.61 This claim is, however, subject to the important qualification in
Article 121(3) that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”62 Although
considerable controversy surrounds Article 121(3),63 there is at least prima-facie
evidence that it has been recognized as customary international law.64 Whatever the
merits of that debate, sea level rise might well cause low-lying islands to disappear
entirely or to lose so much of their area or their freshwater lens as to become
uninhabitable and thus be transformed into “rocks,” thereby causing them to lose
their entitlement to previously established maritime zones.
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Soons’ pioneering paper of 1990 explored several options open to a coastal
State and islands facing such a situation.65 The weight of doctrinal opinion suggests
that the artificial enhancement of an existing rock, so as to make it habitable or
capable of sustaining an economic life of its own, does not transform it into an island
capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights. However, the artificial
maintenance of an island to prevent it from becoming a “rock” for the purposes of
Article 121(3) might, Soons thinks, be permissible.66 Certainly, the downgrading of a
feature’s classification from a small island, or “islet” under the terms of Article
121(1), to a “rock” under Article 121(3) would pose considerable difficulties in
determining the status of the maritime zones that it had previously generated,
particularly because these maritime zones may have been recognized by other States
as being under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State to which it belongs. This
situation is exacerbated when the maritime claims of States in possession (or, indeed,
entirely composed) of low-elevation islands are also under threat from sea level rise;
– especially where small, remote, and low-lying islands give rise to significant
maritime jurisdictional entitlements. In such cases, Soons suggests that we may see
the emergence of a new rule of customary international law that “[c]oastal States are
entitled, in the case of landward shifting of the baseline as a result of sea level rise, to
maintain the outer limits of the territorial sea and of the EEZ where they were located
at a certain moment in accordance with the general rules in force at that time.”67
Moreover, baseline changes could have a bearing on the delimitation of
maritime boundaries that are not yet settled. It has long been accepted that, once
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international maritime boundaries are established by treaty, they do not change
except through agreement among the parties concerned. Once fixed, therefore,
maritime boundaries generally do not shift position if, for example, a basepoint
contributing to the construction of the boundary line in question disappears. This is
because boundary treaties have a privileged status in the international law of treaties
and are not subject to change even in the case of “subsequent fundamental change of
circumstances,”68 such as the disappearance of an important basepoint.69

B

4.5. Fixing/Declaring Baselines and/or Maritime Limits

An alternative to physical intervention is for coastal States to try to preserve their
baselines and maritime rights through legal means. This strategy would not resolve
the issue of inundation of vulnerable low-lying areas. The legal options, however,
might well preserve the State’s rights over the valuable marine resources that could
offer economic support to populations displaced as a result of sea level rise.
Among these options (laid out in detail in Chapter 7), the most promising
methods under existing law would be to unilaterally fix maritime jurisdictional
claims, decoupling them from ambulatory normal baselines. The justification here
comes from Article 5 of the LOSC, which provides that “the normal baseline for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line along the coast as
marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.”70 This
language suggests that the key requirement is that the chart be recognized by the
coastal States. Consequently, if States do not update their charts to reflect the loss of
land territory or basepoints, then the LOSC suggests that the coastal State can be the
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arbiter of its own baselines. Although this could benefit the coastal State, a policy of
not updating charts would pose potential dangers to seafarers as official charts
become more and more inaccurate over time. A dual charts system of official charts
for maritime jurisdictional purposes and navigational charts, however, could resolve
this problem.
The more ambitious option would be to negotiate a formal treaty. There is no
clear model for creating such a treaty, although options exist, some of which are laid
out in Chapter 7, The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is
one option. It has provisions for creating new protocols, but has become almost
moribund over the last five years, and the 194 parties are currently struggling to
negotiate a regime that will come into effect after the Kyoto Protocol commitment
period expires in 2012. In 1994, Freestone argued for a sea level rise protocol to be
part of the UNFCCC, but such a protocol is unlikely to be a high priority in the
current round of negotiations.71 Another option, although similarly unlikely, is to
amend the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. In a detailed study, Freestone and Oude
Elferink have explored the reasons why States have avoided the complex amendment
procedures of the LOSC for both pragmatic and political reasons.72 There is also
growing momentum, discussed in Chapter 9, for a treaty or other agreement to deal
with climate-displaced persons in a way that could also create a solution to some
aspects of the maritime zone dilemma.
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A

5. Conclusions

Sea level rise, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, appears destined to continue and may
accelerate, even if the emissions of greenhouse gases are brought under control and
their levels ultimately decline. As the global climate system works to bring itself into
equilibrium, historical records of times when the global atmosphere had similar
levels of greenhouse gases (albeit not from anthropogenic causes) suggest
substantially higher sea levels in the decades to come.
The implications of higher sea levels for the territorial integrity of some
States are substantial. These implications involve both the inward-looking landward
intrusions of water on low-lying areas and also the outward-looking impacts on
maritime zones. These threats were well identified by scholars, cited earlier, writing
more than two decades ago when the phenomenon of sea level rise was first mooted.
The passing of the years has clarified both the reality of this threat and the severity of
the long-term trends. It is important, however, to appreciate that, whatever the
inevitable very long-term impacts may be in the coming centuries, in the next several
decades it will most likely be a gradual and an episodic process. It is also highly
likely to be variable both in scale and place – for already it is clear that globally it is
not a uniform process – and that both spatial and temporal variability will add
considerably to the uncertainties. Although sea level rise clearly has the potential to
be cataclysmic, in its early impacts there is some hope that it may be more
manageable in certain locations. For example, Webb and Kench’s recent study
showed that 86% of Pacific Islands studied are stable or have increased in size over
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the last few decades despite the higher than average reported sea level rise in the
central Pacific region. Natural movements of material such as sand and silt that can
maintain these processes are, however, impeded by the presence of human structures,
and they may not be able to keep up with accelerating sea level rise and with the loss
of coral reefs from ocean acidification. Hoping that natural accretion alone will
protect the islands and not exploring alternative responses would therefore seem to be
foolhardy.
The main response options were also outlined years ago. These include
construction of physical defenses and the application of legal options. Some of the
options discussed then are repeated here. Physical defenses remain popular and may
become more so, yet they are also problematic, not only in terms of cost but also
because of their uncertain impacts; more sophisticated engineering solutions are
emerging that may possibly mitigate some of the negative externalities of these
projects.
From a legal point of view, many have pointed out the problems that sea level
rise poses to the complicated maritime zone regime developed by the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention. Because the maritime zones are measured from coastal baselines
and basepoints declared or recognized by the coastal State, changes in coastline
configuration and land inundation could have serious effects on these zones. Some
maritime boundaries, such as those agreed by treaty, are fixed, whereas others may
not be. However, it does seem certain that, in the short to medium term at least,
States will be reluctant to reduce or abandon any of their maritime claims. Does law
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therefore stand as an obstacle to reaching an accommodation with sea level rise? We
think not: the international legal system has a lot more flexibility than it is often
credited with. Although formal amendments to the LOSC are highly unlikely,
because of the complexity of the procedures that are involved, as Soons pointed out
in 1990, international customary law inevitably evolves, and so a solution or a series
of solutions seem possible.
The precipitous effects of sea level rise will force States to begin to use some
of the opportunities that legal commentators have already highlighted to retain their
existing maritime zones or at least to try to minimize their losses. As others have
indicated, if the issue becomes pressing, the political organs of the United Nations
are likely to become involved. All in all, we remain positive that the gradual and
evolutionary nature of sea level rise will facilitate an orderly evolution of the legal
regime.
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